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Consciousness as Presence:  





Buddhism teaches that ‘self’ as a substantial, enduring entity is an illusion. 
But for self to be an illusion there must be something in our experience that 
is misinterpreted as self. What is this? The notion of an experiential self 
plays an important role in phenomenological investigations of conscious ex-
perience. Does the illusion of self consist in mistaking a purely experiential 
self for a substantial self? I argue against this and locate the source of the 
illusion in time-consciousness. It is the essence of consciousness to flow, but 
the flow of consciousness presupposes an experiential present. The experi-
ential present — an abiding sense of ‘now’ — is the dimension through which 
experiences are experienced as streaming. It is this, I argue, that is misinter-
preted as an enduring self. I support my account by arguing that the syn-
chronic and diachronic unity of consciousness can be accounted for in terms 
of impersonal, temporal experience, and that conceiving of consciousness as 
the presence-dimension rather than as the I-dimension affords a solution to 
the brain-bisection puzzle.  
Keywords 
non-self, self-identity, self-luminosity, time-consciousness, brain-bisection 
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INTRODUCTION
A mirage is an appearance but not necessarily an illusion. The reality of a mirage 
is that it is an appearance. A mirage is exactly as it appears to be, but noth-
ing more. It is illusory only if it is misapprehended as a distant body of water. 
According to Buddhism, self is illusory in the same sense. An illusion is a mistaken 
cognition. I conceive of myself as a being that exists over time while undergoing 
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various physical and psychological changes. This is an illusion because there is 
no enduring being that undergoes these changes. But for self to be an illusion, 
there must be something that is misapprehended as self. What is this? What is it 
that underlies the illusion of self? 
The answer may seem obvious. What I misconceive as self is a person — spe-
cifically, the person writing these words. In Buddhism, a person (puggala) is 
understood to be a composite being, a collection of five ‘aggregates’ (khandhas). 
A key reason why self is illusory is because no composite thing is irreducibly 
real. A house, for example, is a composite thing; it is nothing over and above the 
parts comprising it. These parts are conceptually grasped together as a ‘house’, 
but the house does not exist independently of its conceptualization as a house. 
Analogously, a person’s body (rūpa) is conceptually constructed: 
Friends, just as when a space is enclosed by timber and creepers, grass, and clay, 
it comes to be termed just ‘house’, so too, when a space is enclosed by bones and 
sinews, flesh and skin, it comes to be termed just ‘material form’ (rūpa). (MN I 190)
A person’s body is only conventionally, not ultimately, real. And the same analy-
sis applies to a person as a whole. A person is composed of various component 
processes (including a body) and is conceptually grasped into being as a person. 
Another passage from the canonical literature compares a person to a chariot:
Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word ‘chariot’ is used,
So, when the aggregates exist,
There is the convention ‘a being’. (SN I 135) 
Like a chariot, a person is only conventionally or nominally real, and the illu-
sion of self consists in mistaking this nominal reality for something that is ulti-
mately real.
But this is not the illusion of self, or at least not the heart of it. Whether or not 
the person writing these words is irreducibly real, he still conceives of himself 
as me. Self is illusory, not because there is here-now the misconceiving of a par-
ticular person as a self, but because there is here-now the misconceiving of this 
person as myself. This is the ‘sense of self’ — the ‘conceit of “I am”’ (asmīti māna) 
— that needs to be explicated. In this paper, I argue that what underlies the illu-
sion of self is the experiential present, an abiding sense of ‘now’. It is this, I argue, 
that is the phenomenological core of the sense of self. The illusion of self consists 
in misapprehending the impersonal ‘now’ as the personal ‘I’. 
THE EXPERIENTIAL SELF
I can imagine that I lived before. I can imagine, for example, that I was once a 
slave in ancient Greece. The life I would have lived in ancient Greece would have 
been quite different from my present life. Still, there would have been something 
that these two lives shared in common. They both would have been experienced 
as my lives. According to the phenomenological tradition, whether or not there 
is some ‘thing’ that is me, there is a continuous thread that runs through the fab-
ric of my conscious life, and this is that it is experienced as my life. This sense of 
ownership or ‘mineness’ characterizes my conscious life and every experience 
belonging to it. When I listen to music, or taste an apple, or see a sunset, there is 
not an impersonal listening, tasting, or seeing; rather, there is something that it 
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is like for me to be listening, tasting, or seeing. If this is correct, then whether or 
not there is a substantial self, there is an experiential self. When I imagine being a 
Greek slave, for example, I imagine experiencing myself as this person, just as I 
now experience myself as the person writing these words. But these are different 
people. If I could have been a Greek slave, then it cannot be that I am the person 
writing these words. It cannot be that this person might have been that person. 
Although I experience this person as me, this person is not me. 
This is one way of understanding the illusion of self, and not only is it consistent 
with the notion of an experiential self, it presupposes it. An illusion is a mistaken 
cognition. For self to be an illusion, there must be something in my experience 
that is misinterpreted; that is, there must be an experiential self. The illusion con-
sists in the fact that this experiential self is misinterpreted as a substantial self. 
I identify myself with a being in the world — with the person writing these words, 
or with this person’s brain, or with this person’s immaterial mind or immortal 
soul. This is the illusion. This person’s experiences are experienced as mine, and 
this is indistinguishable from experiencing this person as me. In reality, though, 
there is nothing in the world that is me, that is, there is nothing in the world that 
is a substantial I-identity. 
Seen in this way, the illusion of self is a special case of a more general illu-
sion. A fundamental tenet of Buddhism is that all conditioned phenomena are 
impermanent (anicca) and, therefore, insubstantial or ‘non-self’ (anattā). In the 
Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta (SN 22:59), the Buddha asks: ‘What do you think, bhikkhus, 
is form permanent or impermanent?’ The answer, of course, is ‘impermanent’. 
He raises the same question with regard to all the constituents of a person — 
the five khandhas — and the answer is the same in each case. No substantial self 
can be found, because there is no constituent of a person that is unchanging or 
permanent. In the Chachakka Sutta (MN 148), we encounter a similar argument:
If anyone says, ‘The body is self’, that is not tenable. The rise and fall of the body 
are discerned, and since its rise and fall are discerned, it would follow: ‘My self 
rises and falls’. That is why it is not tenable for anyone to say, ‘The body is self’. 
Thus the body is non-self. (MN III 283) 
The same argument is applied to every possible candidate for a self, such that it 
is said ‘all dhammas (everything) is non-self’ (AN I 286). There is no self because 
there is no substantial being that underlies the cycles of rising and falling, of 
coming into being and passing away.   
A substantial being is something that endures throughout the cycles of change. 
But if everything at every moment is in the process of coming to be (rising) or 
ceasing to be (falling), there is no time when something simply is. There are no 
beings but only ‘becomings’. The doctrine of impermanence implies that there is 
literally nothing to grasp, nothing to cling to, if ‘even for a mere finger snap’ (AN I 
35). There is a process of becoming by which a living thing grows and matures — a 
process by which a tree comes into being from a seed, for example, or an animal 
from a zygote — and there is a reverse process by which any living thing ages, 
dies, and decays. There is a process of becoming by which a manufactured object 
— a table, a chair, a house, a painting — is created, and a reverse process by which 
it is destroyed. And even when something ‘is’ it continuously changes. ‘Bhikkhus, 
there are these three characteristics that define the conditioned. What three? 
An arising is seen, a vanishing is seen, and its alteration while it persists is seen’ 
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(AN III 152). But, strictly speaking, no ‘thing’ arises or vanishes, no ‘thing’ per-
sists while undergoing alteration; what we conceptualize as an enduring entity 
(as something to cling to) is, in reality, a continuous transformational process.  
The general illusion, then, consists in mistaking continuities for persistent 
identities. In the process of coming to be, an infant arises from a fetus, an ado-
lescent from an infant, and an adult from an adolescent. And no sooner does a 
person ‘come to be’ than the process of ceasing to be begins. A middle-aged per-
son comes into being from the matured adult, an elderly person from the mid-
dle-aged person, and a corpse from the elderly person.1 The corpse itself passes 
through various stages of decomposition, from ‘bloated, livid, and oozing mat-
ter’ to bones ‘rotted and crumbled to dust’ (MN I 58, 58–59). Each stage in this 
transformational process arises from or is causally dependent upon a previous 
stage and is continuous with it, but there is no identity that is preserved in this 
process, no self that comes to be or ceases to be. Of course, there is a sense in 
which a man of sixty is the ‘same’ person as the boy he remembers having been. 
But, as Francis Story comments,
he is the ‘same’ person only in a conventional sense. Actually, there is no single 
item of his psycho-physical complex that is the same as it was when he was a boy. 
In terms of what actually exists it can only be said that the man of sixty belongs to 
the same line of causal continuity as did the boy that he remembers having been: 
he is the end product of an infinite series of connecting states of being — or rather, 
of coming-to-be — which make up his individual world-line. (2000, 17)
In the same way, a stream of consciousness (viññāṇa-sota) is a process, and 
each moment of consciousness arises from a previous moment; each stage in the 
process is dependent upon a previous stage and is continuous with it. It is this, 
according to Buddhism, that accounts for the phenomenon of rebirth or ‘re-
becoming’ (punabbhava). There is no ‘thing’, no inner essence or soul, that passes 
from one lifetime to the next; rather, one person A is ‘reborn as’ another person 
B because the first moment of B’s conscious life arises from the last moment of 
A’s conscious life — ‘arises from’ in the same sense in which each moment of A’s 
conscious life arises from (is causally conditioned by) the immediately preced-
ing moment.
THE RADICAL CONTINGENCY OF SELF
This is a plausible account of the continuity of consciousness, and it is not unlike 
other philosophical treatments of the issue. But it is a metaphysical or third-
personal account, not a phenomenological or first-personal account. It may be 
that each stage in my conscious life is causally dependent upon a previous stage, 
but this does not explain the continuity of consciousness as I live and experience 
it. There is ‘something that it is like’ to experience myself as a being that exists 
over time, and this is not accounted for in terms of causal continuity. To make a 
comparison, there is causal process by which I experience certain things as red 
1. I here describe the processes of coming to be and ceasing to be in terms of conventionally rec-
ognized stages — a fetus, an infant, an adult, a middle-aged person, and so on — but it should 
be understood that there is no substantial being that corresponds to any of these stages. What 
we recognize as an ‘adult’, for example, is simply a stage in a transformational process. Abhid-
hamma metaphysics represents this process, at its most basic level, as an integrated series of 
discrete momentary events (called dhammas).
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— a process involving the molecular properties of these objects, wavelengths of 
light, my retinas, my optic nerves, and my visual cortex. But there is a difference 
between explaining this causal process and accounting for what it is like to experi-
ence something as red. In the same way, it may be that there is a causal process 
by which I experience myself as a being that exists over time, but this does not 
account for what this experience is like. If the illusion of self consists in mistak-
ing an experiential self for a substantial self, then what accounts for the sensed 
continuity of consciousness, my awareness of myself over time, is the sense of 
‘me’ and ‘mine’. Whatever past experiences belong to my conscious stream were 
experienced as mine (or experienced first-personally), and whatever future expe-
riences belong to this stream will be experienced as mine. Phenomenologically, 
it is this qualitative feature of conscious experience, its first-personal nature or 
mineness, that explains the continuity of consciousness. 
But what explains the sense of ‘me’ and ‘mine’? My conscious life is the con-
scious life of a particular person, but this is not what makes it my conscious life; 
rather, what makes this particular person me is the fact that this person’s con-
scious life is mine. My experience of myself is not simply this person’s experience 
of himself because (1) this person might have experienced himself as someone 
else, and (2) I might have experienced myself as someone else. While it is a nec-
essary fact that this person is this person, it is a contingent fact that I am this 
person, and this fact is not explicable in terms of other facts about this person. 
Erich Klawonn refers to this, suggestively, as the ‘incarnational contingency’ of 
the ‘I-dimension’ (2009, 80). The causal account of conscious continuity may cor-
rectly explain how it is that my sense of self is transmitted over time, or why it 
is that I experience myself as the same person throughout this person’s life, but 
it does not explain why I experience myself as this person to begin with. Put dif-
ferently, the causal account may explain why this person experiences himself as 
himself from one moment to the next, but it does not explain why this person 
ever experiences himself as me. As Klawonn argues, ‘My being the person that I 
am and nobody else, is not logically implied by any set of data about the person 
whose mental life happens to be present “in” the I-dimension. I just happen to be 
whoever I am’ (2009, 80).
Let us consider how the above two claims might be defended.2 (1) Suppose that 
the blastocyst from which the person I happen to be had split, resulting in the 
birth of a pair of twins. It is an open question as to whether I would have existed 
in this case. But there are apparently no facts about the situation that could 
explain why I would or would not have existed. Given that both twins would have 
come into being from the very same blastocyst from which I came into being, 
and given that both would contain exactly the same genetic material, why would 
I not exist? But if I did exist, given that both twins would have an equal claim to 
be me, nothing would explain the fact that I was one twin rather than the other 
(on which, see, further, note 7). In the first case, nothing would explain the fact 
that I didn’t exist. In the second, nothing would explain the fact that I did — that 
I was this twin rather than that one. There is apparently nothing about the person 
I happen to be, the person who is writing these words, that explains the fact that 
this person is me. It might have happened that this person was no more me than 
2. For a much fuller defense of these claims, see Fink 2012, 295—300.
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my twin brother (if I had one) was me. My twin brother would have experienced 
himself as someone, but he would not have experienced himself as me (or not the 
same ‘me’ as me). I experience myself as the person writing these words, but this 
person didn’t have to experience himself as me. 
(2) Consider the apparent fact that out of all the people who exist now, or ever 
have existed, or ever will exist, exactly one of them is the person I take myself to be. 
This is truly remarkable. It is remarkable because, as argued above, there is noth-
ing about this person that explains why this person is me. And given this, there is 
no reason to think that I could not have experienced myself as someone else. In 
fact, there is no reason to think that I have not in the past experienced myself as 
someone else or that I will not in the future experience myself as someone else. 
The belief that I am uniquely the person I happen to be has no factual basis at all, 
because there are no facts about this person that explain why this person is me. 
Voltaire once remarked that it is no more surprising to be born twice than it is to be 
born once. If, as Klawonn says, I just happen to be the person I am, then it is indeed 
a surprising fact that I exist — in fact, astonishing. But if there is nothing unique 
about this person that explains the fact that he experiences himself as me, then 
there is no reason to think that this is a unique experience; that is, there is no rea-
son to think that no one else in the past has ever experienced himself (or herself) 
as me (the same ‘me’ as the ‘me’ I currently take myself to be) or that no one else 
in the future will ever have this experience. Of course, there is no reason to think 
that this does occur repeatedly, but by the same token there is no reason to think 
that it occurs only once. Both possibilities seem equally likely, or equally unlikely.
The existence of the person writing these words is a contingent fact, but unlike 
the existence of this person, my existence is a radically contingent fact in the 
sense that nothing explains it. This is one respect in which self-identity differs 
from personal identity. There is an explanation of why it is that this person exists 
— an explanation involving the existence of a particular spermatozoon and a par-
ticular ovum or the genetic material contained therein — but there is no explana-
tion of why it is that I exist (of why it is that anyone ever experiences himself or 
herself as me) because there are no facts that explain why anyone is me. The fact 
that I exist might be compared to another inexplicable fact: the fact that a world 
exists. There is no fact more basic than the fact that a world exists, and hence 
there are no other, more basic facts in terms of which it is explicable. The fact 
that there is something rather than nothing, like the fact that I exist, is a radi-
cally contingent fact. There just happens to exist a world, and I just happen to exist. 
The fact that I exist, like the fact that a world exists, is utterly mysterious. But 
maybe the riddle of my first-personal existence is a riddle only because of how I 
conceive of myself. Understood in one way, the illusion of self consists in mistak-
ing a purely experiential self for a substantial self. But maybe there is a deeper, 
more fundamental illusion. Maybe the deepest illusion is taking the experiential 
self to be a ‘self’ rather than a strictly impersonal feature of conscious awareness.
THE SELF-LUMINOSITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The metaphor of ‘illumination’ plays an important role in classical Indian phe-
nomenology.3 ‘Luminous, bhikkhus, is this mind, but it is defiled by adventitious 
3. Some theorists — referred to as ‘other-illumination’ theorists— held that experiences become 
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defilements. Luminous, bhikkhus, is this mind, and it is freed from adventitious 
defilements’ (AN I 10). Consciousness has the quality of radiance (pabhā). Like a 
lamp, consciousness illuminates the world; it is the essence of consciousness to 
make things appear. And like a lamp, not only does consciousness illuminate the 
world, it illuminates itself. It is self-illuminating. But the self-luminosity of con-
sciousness can be understood in two, importantly different ways. Understood 
egologically, it means that to consciously experience anything is to experience 
it as one’s own experience. Consciousness is essentially first-personal, whether 
or not this involves a substantial self or ego. Understood non-egologically, con-
sciousness is self-luminous in the sense that every conscious experience is simul-
taneously aware of itself (though this is not understood as a higher-level or 
transitive awareness). In this view, as Dan Zahavi expresses it, self-awareness is 
understood ‘as the acquaintance that consciousness has with itself and not as an 
awareness of the experiencing self ’ (2005, 100). 
Both views are represented in the Buddhist tradition. Dharmakīrti, the seventh-
century Yogācārin philosopher, gave an egological account of self-luminosity 
(svasaṃvedana), arguing that consciousness is inherently first-personal. But, he 
argued, this feature of conscious awareness does not contradict Buddhist teach-
ing. Unlike a substantial self, self-luminosity is purely formal or experiential. 
It is, as Joel Krueger describes it, ‘the phenomenally continuous, first-person 
perspective one has on the stream of one’s own experience. It is a feature of the 
stream of experience, and not a self standing behind the experience’ (2011, 33). The 
perspectival self, as a purely formal dimension of conscious experience, might 
be compared to a spatial perspective in visual experience (cf. Searle 2004, 204). 
Whatever is seen is seen from a spatial point of view, but a spatial point of view is 
nothing in itself. In the same way, whatever is experienced is experienced from a 
personal point of view, but a personal point of view is nothing in itself; like a spa-
tial perspective, the first-person perspective is a structural feature of conscious 
awareness and nothing more.
In Dzogchen, on the other hand, self-luminosity is understood impersonally. It 
refers, in Sogyal Rinpoche’s words, to ‘the sky-like nature of our mind’, a dimen-
sion through which experiences flow like passing clouds, ‘a primordial, pure, pris-
tine awareness that is at once intelligent, cognizant, radiant, and always awake’ 
(2002, 48). Whereas, for Dharmakīrti, self-luminosity is a feature of the experien-
tial stream and, as such, is ‘dependently conditioned by the continually changing 
interplay of successive contents’ (Krueger 2011, 33), in Dzogchen self-luminosity 
situates consciousness (or direct awareness, Skt vidyā, Tib Rig pa) outside the realm 
of conditioned, worldly phenomena. In the Mahāyana Uttaratantra Śāstra (a text 
from the tathāgatagarbha literature that inspired Dzogchen), we read: 
The nature of mind as the element of space 
does not [depend upon] causes or conditions, 
nor does it [depend on] a gathering of these. 
It has neither arising, cessation, nor abiding. 
conscious when they are the objects of a higher-order introspective awareness. Other theo-
rists — ‘self-illumination’ theorists — believed that every cognition is reflexively self-aware. 
Here I focus on the second school of thought, which also represents the mainstream view in 
modern Western phenomenology. For discussion of these contrasting views, see Siderits et al. 
(2011, 9–11).
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This clear and luminous nature of mind 
is as changeless as space. It is not afflicted  
by desire and so on, the adventitious stains, 
which are sprung from incorrect thoughts. 
                                                                                      (Gyamtso and Fuchs 2000, 27)
Consciousness is not a worldly phenomenon because, unlike worldly phenom-
ena, it is unconditioned: it ‘does not [depend upon] causes or conditions’. It is 
the dimension or ‘space’ in which worldly phenomena make their appearance. 
Situating consciousness outside the phenomenal realm might seem to contra-
dict the Buddha’s teaching on Dependent Origination. In the Mahātaṇhāsankhaya 
Sutta (MN 38), the Buddha emphasized that consciousness (viññāṇa) is ‘depend-
ently arisen’ and that ‘without a condition there is no origination of conscious-
ness’. But here and elsewhere the Buddha’s teaching seems to be that every 
specific form of consciousness dependently arises. In the same sutta, we read: 
When consciousness arises dependent on the eye and forms, it is reckoned as eye-
consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on the ear and sounds, it is 
reckoned as ear-consciousness; … when consciousness arises dependent on the 
mind and mind-objects, it is reckoned as mind-consciousness. (MN I 259) 
But this does not mean that consciousness itself is a dependent, conditioned 
phenomenon. Indeed, if the essence of consciousness is luminosity, and if con-
sciousness is essentially self-luminous, this implies that consciousness does not 
depend upon worldly causes or conditions; consciousness illuminates itself inde-
pendently of any conditioning factors. Because consciousness is uncondition-
ally luminous, the unconditioned nature of consciousness is pure, self-luminous 
awareness. Precisely this line of thought has been developed by Dzogchen teach-
ers. Nyoshul Khenpo Rinpoche once wrote:
Profound and tranquil, free from complexity 
Uncompounded luminous clarity, 
Beyond the mind of conceptual ideas; 
This is the depth of the mind of the Victorious Ones.
In this there is not a thing to be removed 
Nor anything that needs to be added. 
It is merely the immaculate 
Looking naturally at itself. 
                                                   (Quoted in Rinpoche 2002, 50)  
Nibbāna is unconditioned. Hence, the mind of the ‘Victorious Ones’ — those who 
have crossed over into final Nibbāna — is unconditioned; it is pure (‘immaculate’), 
self-luminous (‘Looking naturally at itself’) awareness. We might note that a simi-
lar point (concerning the unconditioned nature of the enlightened mind) is made 
in the Alagaddūpama Sutta (MN 22), where the Buddha describes the consciousness 
of a bhikkhu who has ‘cut off at the root’ the ‘conceit of “I am”’: 
Bhikkhus, when the gods with Indra, with Brahmā, and with Pajāpati seek a bhik-
khu who is thus liberated in mind, they do not find [anything of which they could 
say]: ‘The consciousness of one thus gone is supported by this’. Why is that? One 
thus gone, I say, is untraceable here and now. (MN I 140)
There is also the following cryptic verse from the Brahmanimantanika Sutta (MN 
49) in which the Buddha describes the meditative experience of Nibbāna: 
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Consciousness non-manifesting, 
Boundless, luminous all-around. (MN I 290)
Commenting on this verse, Bhikkhu Bodhi writes that ‘this meditative experi-
ence does not make manifest any conditioned phenomena of the world and thus 
may be truly described as “non-manifesting”’ (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2009, 1250). 
Unlike other forms of consciousness, which arise from contact with worldly phe-
nomena, the meditative experience of Nibbāna arises only when consciousness 
is liberated from all conditioning factors. This is why Nibbāna is ‘the unageing, 
unailing, deathless, sorrowless, and undefiled supreme security from bondage’ 
(MN I 163). The unconditioned nature of consciousness, revealed in the medita-
tive experience of Nibbāna, is pure awareness, ‘Boundless, luminous all-around’.4 
CONSCIOUSNESS AS PRESENCE
Phenomenologically, how might we distinguish between these two views — the 
egological (personalist) and the non-egological (impersonalist) conception of 
self-luminosity? Perhaps the difference has to do with whether there is some-
thing that remains invariant throughout the course of a conscious life. For the 
impersonalist, each experience is aware of itself and is in this sense self-illumi-
nating. While this is so, there is no continuous self, not even an experiential one. 
Each experience is unique, and so each episode of self-awareness is unique. There 
is, or so it would seem, no experiential constant in the conscious flow. For the 
personalist, on the other hand, there is an experiential constant in the series of 
conscious states, something that remains the same, and this is a unique sense of 
‘me’ and ‘mine’. 
In the Theravāda tradition, the selfless or impersonal nature of experience is 
confirmed through meditative practice (specifically, insight or vipassanā medita-
tion). As Henepola Gunaratana explains:
With mindfulness one sees all phenomena without reference to concepts like ‘me’, 
‘my’, or ‘mine’. For example, suppose there is a pain in your left leg. Ordinarily con-
sciousness would say, ‘I have a pain’. Using mindfulness, one would simply note the 
sensation as a sensation. One would not tack on the extra concept ‘I’. (1992, 152) 
Bhikkhu Bodhi writes:
The Buddha teaches that the craving and clinging that hold us in bondage are 
sustained by a network of ‘conceivings’ (maññita) — deluded views, conceits, and 
suppositions that the mind fabricates by an internal process of mental commen-
tary. … The task of insight meditation is to sever our attachments by enabling us 
to pierce through this net of conceptual projections in order to see things as they 
really are. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 2009, 39–40)
According to these commentators, ‘self’ is a conceptual construction. There is the 
conceptualization of myself as a unitary being that exists over time, and this self-
concept is embedded in various past-directed and future-directed psychological 
states. I cannot remember yesterday’s events, or have regrets, or mourn some 
loss, or hold grudges without conceptually projecting ‘myself’ into the past. I 
cannot anticipate my retirement, or plan a vacation, or hope to learn French, or 
worry about meeting my bills without conceptually projecting ‘myself’ into the 
4. This meditative experience also reveals the nature of final Nibbāna when consciousness is 
permanently liberated from all conditioning factors.    
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future. Just as I conceive (or misconceive) of things in the world, not as continu-
ous processes, but as enduring entities, I conceive of ‘myself’ in the same way. 
Yet it is clear that I do not simply conceptualize myself as a being that exists 
over time; I also experience myself in this way. If I sit in meditation and follow 
my breath, I am not reflecting upon the past or anticipating the future. I am not 
conceptually connecting my present experience with any past or future experi-
ence. My consciousness is confined to what is immediately present. And what 
I experience when I anchor my awareness in the present moment is the conti-
nuity of consciousness at its most basic or primitive level. What I experience is 
the flow of time. Even if I altogether lacked the conceptual resources to project 
myself into the past or the future, so long as I was conscious, I would experience 
the flow of time. Consciousness is never static; it is essentially dynamic; it is the 
essence of consciousness to flow. And the conceptually constructed self has noth-
ing to do with the moment-by-moment fluidity or continuity of lived experience. 
The moment-by-moment continuity of consciousness is its temporal continuity.
This, I believe, is the key to unlocking the sense of self. Consciousness is essen-
tially luminous. Like a beam of light illuminating a train passing in the night, 
consciousness illuminates a passing stream of experiential phenomena. Things 
appear, as if out of nothing, pass through this area of illumination and slip 
from view. It is the essence of consciousness to make things appear. But things 
appear only in the present moment. The appearing of things is their ‘presencing’. 
Metaphysically, becoming is the cyclical process of coming to be and ceasing to 
be, of arising and passing away. But experientially, it is the process of coming to 
be present and ceasing to be present, of appearing and disappearing; it is a process 
forever flowing through the now. If it is consciousness that makes things appear, 
and if the appearing of things is their ‘presencing’, then it is consciousness that 
‘presences’ the world. This abiding sense of presence, this area of illumination 
through which phenomena stream, is, I believe, the essence of the sense of self. 
Wolfgang Fasching (2009) makes a similar observation. ‘My suggestion’, he 
writes, ‘is that “the I” has to be conceived of as having the character of a dimen-
sion with regard to its experiences’, (146) and he specifically equates the ‘I’ with 
consciousness. Consciousness is the dimension of phenomenal appearance — a 
dimension through which ‘experiences are exclusively present as streaming’ 
(144). He writes: 
Each ‘now’ I am aware of is only there for me as passing by, in its transition to 
the ‘no-longer-now’ (for a moment is not now present and then elapses later on; 
rather, the very essence of the present is temporal transition, and it is precisely 
as such that it is present to us).  … There is no givenness of a now except as pass-
ing. (145)
This is true with regard to the contents of consciousness, but not with regard 
to consciousness itself. If each now is present only as passing, if the passage of 
time consists of the ever-changing now, what is it with respect to which the now 
changes and time passes? To make sense of the passage of time, at least as we 
experience it, we must suppose that there is an invariable conscious structure, 
a fixed reference point, with respect to which time passes. That is, there must 
be an invariable, experiential present. I am suggesting that the experiential pre-
sent is not just a structural feature of consciousness, but consciousness itself. 
Consciousness is the presence-dimension. 
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We are now in a position to expose the deeper, more fundamental illusion that 
is the sense of self. Fasching says, and I agree (up to a point), that  
I am my consciousness, and not some entity that has or owns it, but this conscious-
ness is the one experiencing, the one presence as the realm of existence of the 
many experiential contents (and consequently ‘transcendent’ with regard to them, 
whilst not being a result of a synthesis between them). (144)
But why, we must ask, should we call this consciousness my consciousness? Why 
should a temporal point of view, the standpoint of the experiential present, be 
equated with a personal point of view, the standpoint of the experiential self? 
Fasching correctly observes that ‘There is no present experience that is not there 
as streaming’, but he immediately adds that it is not an impersonal dimension, 
the experiential present, through which experiences stream; rather, it is ‘the 
dimension of first-personal presence’ that ‘abides as the “locus” of passage’ (145). 
This ‘dimension of first-personal presentation’, he tells us, has ‘no other essential 
property than being me’ (146). But why should the ‘now’ be personalized as the 
‘me’? If the account I have given is correct, then there is indeed an experiential 
constant in the flow of consciousness, but this is not an egological dimension. The 
person writing these words experiences himself as me, but the phenomenologi-
cal basis for this is the experiential present. The illusion of self is the mistaken 
cognition that the ‘now’ is the ‘me’.
The notion of an experiential self plays a dual role in understanding conscious-
ness. First, it accounts for the synchronic and diachronic unity of consciousness. 
What unites simultaneous experiences as organic elements of the same moment 
of conscious awareness is that they are simultaneously experienced as mine; and 
what unites consciousness over time is that past, present, and future experiences 
have been, are, or will be experienced as mine. As Dan Zahavi writes: 
Whereas we live through a number of different experiences, the dimension of first-
personal givenness remains unchanging. It stands, to use a striking image from 
James, permanently, like a rainbow on a waterfall, its own quality unchanged by 
the events that stream through it (2005, 67).5  
But if I am correct, the problem of the synchronic unity of consciousness is 
misstated. The question is not what binds together different but simultaneous 
experiences to form a unified moment of conscious awareness; rather, these expe-
riences are bound together precisely because they are experienced as simultane-
ous. Similarly, the problem of the diachronic unity of consciousness is misstated. 
The question is not what unifies consciousness over time, because it is time itself 
that unifies consciousness. What unites my experiences over time is that they 
flow through the same presence-dimension. Whatever belongs to a given stream 
of consciousness was, is, or will be experienced in that stream as now. The conti-
nuity of consciousness is its temporal continuity, and the experiential constant 
that underlies this process is the experiential present, not the experiential self.
Second, the notion of an experiential self accounts for the basic difference 
between one stream of consciousness and another. If you and I are listening to 
the same music, there is a difference between your listening to the music and my 
5. Interestingly, and I think tellingly, Zahavi elsewhere evokes the very same image to illustrate 
Edmund Husserl’s conception of time-consciousness as an ‘unchangeable form of presence’ 
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2012, 92).
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listening to the music even if our two experiences are otherwise indistinguish-
able. My experience is experienced as mine and your experience is experienced as 
yours. It is the first-personal nature of conscious experience, the sense of ‘me’ and 
‘mine’, that grounds the distinction between one experiential life and another. 
But this distinction can also be accounted for in terms of impersonal, temporal 
experience. Different conscious lives are different rivers of time, and each expe-
rience in the temporal flow is experienced as following another. It is not just that 
one experience does follow another, but that it is experienced as following another. 
The experience of time is not a succession of experiences but the experience of 
succession. Thus, even though your experience of something may occur after my 
experience of something, your experience is not experienced as occurring after 
mine. Your conscious life is different than mine because your experience of time’s 
flow is different than mine. 
THE BRAIN-BISECTION PUZZLE
As things stand, there would seem to be no basis for choosing between an egologi-
cal and a non-egological understanding of self-luminosity. Both accounts seem 
to fit the experiential data. In this section, I build a case for the non-egological 
view by considering what it is like to have a divided mind.
Research seems to show that a ‘split-brain’ patient — a patient whose corpus 
callosum has been surgically severed — does not have a unified conscious life but 
rather two parallel streams of consciousness.6 One split-brain patient reported 
that, when dressing himself, he sometimes found himself pulling up his pants 
with one hand while trying to pull them down with the other, or simultane-
ously buttoning and unbuttoning his jacket with different hands. Another patient 
reported that one of her hands would sometimes wake her up in the morning with 
a slap if she overslept (Darling 1996, Ch. 6). Such anomalies (as well as controlled 
experiments) strongly suggest that a split-brain patient is not really one patient 
but two.7 This raises the question: Which of the two patients, if either one, is the 
6. Thomas Nagel (1971) was one of the first philosophers to discuss the research on split-brain 
patients. For a current, philosophically rigorous discussion of the research, see Bayne (2008). 
For a more accessible and engaging discussion, see Darling (1996, Ch. 6). It is the brain-bisec-
tion puzzle that inspired Derek Parfit’s groundbreaking work on the problem of personal 
identity (cf. Parfit 1971; 1987, 245–248).
7. This is a controversial claim, but what are the options? Either both hemispheres are simul-
taneously conscious (the ‘two-streams’ model, endorsed here), or only one hemisphere is 
conscious (the so-called ‘zombie’ model), or the two hemispheres are alternatively conscious 
(the ‘switch’ model). Defenders of the zombie model argue that consciousness is restricted 
to the language-generating hemisphere (typically, the left), reducing the minor hemisphere 
to an unconscious, information-processing system. Bayne (2008) makes a convincing case 
against the zombie model, which I will not duplicate here except to say that if consciousness 
presupposes linguistic capacity, this entails, quite implausibly, that pre-linguistic children, 
aphasics, and non-linguistic animals are unconscious automata. Bayne himself favors the 
switch model, according to which the two hemispheres of a split-brain patient are not simul-
taneously but alternatively consciousness. One problem with the switch model concerns 
exactly how the switch occurs. If we allow for the possibility that the two hemispheres of a 
split-brain patient might be completely disjoined — and, perhaps, transplanted into different 
bodies forming two independently functioning human beings — the switch model becomes 
utterly implausible. Of course, there are no actual cases like this, but the possibility that a 
single stream of consciousness can divide into two separate streams must be taken seriously, 
especially by Buddhists. The split-brain paradox is only one way of framing this possibil-
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original patient? There is no reason to suppose that a successful brain bisection 
kills the patient. But if the original patient does not survive as just one of the two 
split-brain patients (because both patients have an equal claim to be the original 
patient) or as both (because one person cannot be two people), how is it possible 
for someone to survive a brain bisection?
Suppose I have undergone a brain-bisection. Let us grant that I survive the pro-
cedure and that there is no reason to think that I survive as just one or the other 
of my two hemispheric selves.8 Somehow I survive as both (at least in the sense 
that what matters in my continued existence is preserved in both cases). But if 
the conscious lives of both hemispheric selves are equally my conscious lives, 
what is it that is me? The answer cannot be that I am the human being I always 
was, but neither does there appear to be a better answer. If the subject of one of 
my conscious lives is my left hemisphere and the subject of my other conscious 
life is my right hemisphere, how could I be both my right and left hemispheric 
selves? We might even imagine that the two hemispheres are transplanted into 
two human bodies forming two independent human beings. Clearly, these would 
be different persons, and just as clearly there would be no one identifiable as me 
who survived as both.  
This reinforces the point that the experiential self should not be equated with a 
substantial self. Even though ‘I’ survive the split-brain procedure, there is nothing 
after the procedure identifiable as me. But, more than this, the brain-bisection 
puzzle calls into question the notion of an experiential self. If it is the sense of 
ownership or mineness that explains my experience of existence over time, then 
both streams of consciousness must simultaneously be experienced as mine, and 
this is so even though there is nothing that is me. But how is this possible? If the 
experiences of both hemispheres are simultaneously my experiences, then I am 
simultaneously aware of what occurs in both hemispheric streams of conscious-
ness. But if this is so, then I do not have a divided consciousness after all, but a 
unified conscious life. So granting that I do have a divided consciousness, it can-
not be that the experiences of both hemispheres are my experiences.
This analysis is bolstered by what Bayne and Chalmers (2003) refer to as the 
‘phenomenal unity thesis’: that the simultaneous phenomenal states of any sub-
ject are phenomenally unified. For example, suppose that in one of my hemi-
spheric streams of consciousness there is an awareness of a chill in my right hand 
while in the other there is an awareness of an itch in my left hand. According to 
ity; another involves the doctrine of rebirth. According to the orthodox Buddhist account, 
conception occurs only ‘when there is the union of the mother and father, and the mother is 
in season, and the gandhabha is present’ (MN I 266). Bhikkhu Bodhi identifies the gandhabha 
with ‘the stream of consciousness … coming over from the previous existence and bring-
ing along its total accumulation of kammic tendencies and personality traits’ (Ñāṇamoli and 
Bodhi 2009, 1234). Now consider the case of identical twins, discussed earlier. The fission 
that results in identical twins, who certainly have separate streams of consciousness, occurs 
after conception. Hence, orthodox Buddhists must concede, not only that it is possible that a 
stream of consciousness can divide into two separate streams, but that this actually occurs.
(Editor: though the other possibility is that another stream of consciousness arrives at the 
time of the split, and that the previously arrived stream stays with only one side of the split 
brain).
8. My pre-bisection stream of consciousness is causally continuous with both post-bisection 
streams.  
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the phenomenal unity thesis, if there is something that it is like for me to experi-
ence the chill and, at the same time, something that it is like for me to experience 
the itch, then there must be something that it is like for me to experience both 
the chill and the itch; I must have a unified phenomenal state subsuming both 
experiences.9 But if I have a divided mind, then there is no unified awareness of 
what occurs in both streams of consciousness. Therefore, it cannot be that there 
is something that it is like for me to experience the chill and also something that 
it is like for me to experience the itch; it cannot be, in other words, that both 
experiences are mine. 
These considerations apparently show that mineness, whether or not it is 
anchored in a substantial self, has nothing to do with my existence over time. 
But if this is not what matters, what does? The answer must be that I survive as 
both hemispheric selves — that is, that what matters in my continued existence 
is preserved by both hemispheric streams of consciousness — because the right 
sort of relations hold between my pre-bisection conscious life and the conscious 
lives of my two post-bisection hemispheres. My conscious life flows on but as two 
separate streams. Crucially, though, it would be incorrect to describe either one 
of these streams as ‘mine’ in the sense in which this is understood by the person-
alist. The continuity of my conscious life is to be accounted for in terms of strictly 
impersonal relations between the different phases of my mental continuum, and 
the holding of these relations is all that matters in my continued existence.
According to the standard Buddhist account, my existence over time is to be 
accounted for in terms of the holding of causal connections between the succes-
sive phases of my mental continuum. Thus, ‘I’ survive as both hemispheric selves 
because both hemispheric streams of consciousness are causally continuous with 
my pre-bisection conscious life. But, again, this is a metaphysical or third-per-
sonal account of conscious continuity, not a phenomenological or first-personal 
account. There is something that it is like to experience myself as a being that 
exists over time, and this must be understood experientially. There is also some-
thing that it is like to have a divided mind, and this must be understood experi-
entially too. The problem, for the personalist, is that this cannot be accounted for 
in terms of the sense of ownership. If both post-bisection streams of conscious-
ness are simultaneously mine then there must be something that it is like for me 
to be simultaneously aware of what occurs in both streams. But if there is some-
thing that it is like for me to be aware of what occurs in both streams, then I do 
not have a divided mind. Put differently, while there must be something that it 
is like to have a divided mind, there cannot be something that it is like for me to 
have a divided mind.  
Although we cannot account for what this is like in terms of the sense of own-
ership, we can account for this in terms of temporal experience. My conscious 
life before the procedure is temporally continuous with the conscious lives of 
my two post-bisection hemispheres. What is experienced in each hemispheric 
stream after the procedure is experienced as occurring after the experiences in 
my pre-bisection conscious life, and this is the only sense in which ‘I’ survive as 
both hemispheres. I have a divided consciousness after the procedure because 
9. This is certainly true on a holistic conception of consciousness, according to which individual 
experiences are not the building blocks of consciousness but rather modifications of a unified 
phenomenal field. See Bayne and Chalmers (2003, 38–40) and Searle (2004, 95–96, 105–109).
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there is no shared experiential present; the simultaneous experiences occurring 
in these hemispheric streams are not experienced as simultaneous. To clarify 
this, let us suppose that my last experience before my consciousness divides is a 
visual impression of the color green. As my consciousness divides, this impres-
sion changes into the color yellow in my right-hemispheric stream and into the 
color blue in my left-hemispheric stream.10 To experience change, one event 
must be experienced as occurring after another. Thus, in my right-hemispheric 
stream, the experience of yellow is experienced as occurring after the experi-
ence of green; whereas in in the left-hemispheric stream, the experience of blue 
is experienced as occurring after the experience of green. Although the expe-
riences of yellow and blue occur simultaneously, they are not experienced as 
simultaneous. It is for this reason, and only for this reason, that they belong to 
separate streams of consciousness.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the essence of the sense of self is the sense of presence. The 
‘self’ is the now personalized as the me. An illusion is a mistaken cognition, and 
it is this mistaken cognition that is the illusion of self. There is an experiential 
constant in conscious awareness, but this is the experiential present, not the 
experiential self. I have supported this by arguing that the synchronic and dia-
chronic unity of consciousness can be accounted for in terms of impersonal, 
temporal experience, and that this account, unlike the personalist view, solves 
the brain-bisection puzzle.
There is a sense in which ‘I’ might have lived before — say, as a slave in ancient 
Greece. If the conscious life of a particular Greek slave is temporally continuous 
with the conscious life of the person writing these words, then ‘I’ was once a 
Greek slave in the same sense in which ‘I’ was once a child. We can at least imag-
ine how this might be the case. There might be a continuum of experiences such 
that (1) each of these experiences is experienced as occurring after its predeces-
sor, and (2) one segment of this continuum is the conscious stream of a particu-
lar Greek slave and a later segment is the conscious stream of the person writing 
these words. Beyond this, there is no sense in which ‘I’ might have been a Greek 
slave. But this is not what I imagine when I imagine this possibility. When I imag-
ine this, I imagine that I experienced myself as a Greek slave, just as I now expe-
rience myself as the person writing these words. But if my account is correct, 
I never experience myself as anyone. What I cognize as my experiencing myself as 
someone is, in reality, that person’s experience of time. It is this mistaken cogni-





10.  For the purpose of this illustration, we can imagine that I am operated on (as sometimes 
occurs in brain procedures) while I am conscious.
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